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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-1326 
________________ 
 
MARIUSZ DANIEL MARCINKOWSKI, 
         Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
         Respondent  
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A029-046-323) 
Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on January 24, 2019 
 
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: September 12, 2019) 
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________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
This case requires us to decide whether we have jurisdiction to review the Board 
of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) determination that Petitioner Mariusz Daniel 
Marcinkowski was convicted of a particular controlled substance offense under state law.  
However, because courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal against aliens who have been convicted of controlled substance offenses,1 our 
review is limited to confirming that the crime of conviction was indeed a controlled 
substance offense.  We conclude here that Marcinkowski’s crime of conviction was such 
an offense.  We will therefore deny his petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
I 
 Marcinkowski is a citizen of Poland and a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States.  In December 2005, he was charged in Bucks County Criminal Court with three 
counts:  Count One, possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver 
and/or manufacture in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30); Count Two, possession 
of a controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(16); and 
Count Three, use or possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-
113(a)(32). 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). 
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Marcinkowski does not contest that in January 2006 he was convicted of one of 
those three counts, but he argues that the record does not reveal which one.  The 
documents related to his criminal record include an Information, a “Leave to Submit” 
form, and two “Criminal Court Sheets.”  The Information lists the three counts, and the 
Leave to Submit indicates that he pleaded guilty on January 31, 2006.  The first Criminal 
Court Sheet states that sentencing was deferred in order to allow Marcinkowski to bring 
in witnesses.  The second Criminal Court Sheet is dated March 17, 2006, and shows that 
Marcinkowski was sentenced to prison for at least one year but not more than two years.  
A handwritten notation appears just above the sentence, indicating “CT #1.”2  At the 
bottom of the page, another handwritten notation reads “NFP remaining counts.”3   
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) opened immigration proceedings in 
March 2017 and charged Marcinkowski as removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 
(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),4 which provide for the removal of 
an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony or a crime relating to a controlled 
substance.  Marcinkowski moved to terminate his immigration proceedings on the ground 
that he was not convicted of a removable crime.  An immigration judge denied his motion 
on May 31, 2017, finding that DHS had met its burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that Marcinkowski had been convicted of Count One.5  The 
                                              
2 Admin. Record (A.R.) 187. 
3 Id.  
4 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i). 
5 See id. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). 
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immigration court entered an order of removal on August 16, 2017.6  Marcinkowski 
sought review before the BIA, which dismissed his petition, finding “no clear error” in 
the IJ’s finding with respect to the “factual question” of the “identity of the respondent’s 
statute of conviction.”7  He timely appealed.   
II 
We must first establish our jurisdiction over Marcinkowski’s appeal.8  He raises 
only one issue:  whether the BIA erred in holding, on the basis of the documents related 
to his criminal record described above, that the IJ correctly found that he was convicted 
of Count One.  He does not challenge the BIA’s conclusion that 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-
113(a)(30)—the violation of which is charged in Count One—qualifies as a controlled 
substance offense that would render him removable, if indeed he were convicted of 
violating that provision.   
Because of a jurisdiction-stripping statute, the Courts of Appeals do not have 
jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against aliens who are removable for having 
                                              
6 At an August 7, 2017, hearing, DHS submitted a docket sheet from the Court of 
Common Pleas of Bucks County indicating that Marcinkowski pleaded guilty to all three 
counts, was sentenced to a prison term of at least one and not more than two years on 
Count One, and received “No Further Penalty” on Counts Two and Three.  A.R. 126.  
The IJ admitted this docket sheet for identification purposes only.  While the IJ relied, at 
least in part, on the docket sheet in “go[ing] forward and issu[ing] an order of removal,” 
A.R. 115, we confine our review to the documents the BIA considered when issuing its 
own opinion, which do not include the docket sheet.   
7 A.R. 4. 
8 The government argued in its motion opposing a stay that we do not have jurisdiction. 
Although it has abandoned this argument, we must independently satisfy ourselves that 
we have jurisdiction.  Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 76–77 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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been convicted of a controlled substance offense.9  Nevertheless, for two reasons, we do 
have jurisdiction over the narrow issue presented by Marcinkowski’s appeal—whether or 
not he was convicted on Count One.  First, we have long held that “we have jurisdiction 
to determine whether the necessary jurisdiction-stripping facts are present in a particular 
case.”10  Here, the “jurisdiction-stripping fact” would be Marcinkowski’s conviction of 
an enumerated offense rendering him removable.  This inquiry necessarily includes both 
a factual component (the determination of the offense) and a legal component (whether it 
qualifies as an enumerated offense), and it is of no moment that Marcinkowski only 
challenges the first of these.  Second, following the passage of the REAL ID Act of 
2005,11 the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision does not preclude our review of 
questions of law.12  Because our threshold jurisdiction is a legal question,13 our 
jurisdiction is authorized by the statute.  We therefore have jurisdiction to review 
Marcinkowski’s argument that he was not convicted on Count One.14  
                                              
9 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). 
10 Borrome v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012); see also 
Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001).  
11 Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 302, 310 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
13 E.g., Byrd v. Corestates Bank, N.A. (In re Corestates Tr. Fee Litig.), 39 F.3d 61, 63 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (“The existence vel non of subject matter jurisdiction is a legal issue over 
which we exercise plenary review.”). 
14 See Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause we have jurisdiction to 
determine our own jurisdiction, the jurisdictional question and the merits collapse into 
one.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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III 
Having determined that we have jurisdiction, we would turn in the normal course 
to our standard of review,15 which Marcinkowski says should be de novo but which the 
government argues should be for “substantial evidence.”  We need not resolve whether de 
novo or substantial evidence review is called for, however, because even assuming that 
we apply de novo review, Marcinkowski cannot prevail on this record.16  
                                              
15 As the BIA issued its own opinion based on the record before it, we review its decision 
and not the IJ’s.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ‘final 
order’ we review is that of the BIA.”). 
16 Judge Roth does not agree that the substantial evidence standard could apply here.  The 
following sets forth her views:   
The substantial evidence standard is not relevant to this situation.  I would 
not wish to imply that it might be.  If the substantial evidence standard were 
to be applied by the BIA or by other courts in future opinions in this area, 
there are many potential problems.  For example, if the BIA again applied 
the substantial evidence standard to determine its own jurisdiction, our 
review would be more difficult.  Indeed, I am of the opinion that jurisdiction 
is a legal issue to be determined by the courts, not a factual issue to be 
determined by an administrative body.   
Moreover, exercising de novo review over the determination of the crime of 
conviction aligns with the use of the same standard at the legal inquiry stage 
when determining whether the conviction constitutes a controlled substance 
offense, or, in other cases, whether an alien’s crime of conviction is an 
aggravated felony.  The de novo standard is used at that stage of the inquiry 
because the question of whether an alien’s crime of conviction constitutes an 
enumerated offense is “a purely legal question that governs the appellate 
court’s jurisdiction.”  Singh v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 839 F.3d 273, 282 
(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Restrepo v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 617 F.3d 787, 
790 (3d Cir. 2010)).  From a practical standpoint, it would be difficult to 
separate the review of the fact of conviction from the legal inquiry of whether 
its elements constitute an enumerated offense.  Using two different standards, 
one to determine the statute of conviction and another to determine if it is an 
enumerated offense, would needlessly introduce confusion and inconsistency 
into an already complicated analytical framework.  I believe that our interest 
in avoiding such confusion and inconsistency is sufficiently compelling to 
require the use of de novo review here. 
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To determine whether Marcinkowski was convicted of Count One, 
section 240(c)(3)(B) of the INA authorizes us to consider “[a]ny document or record 
prepared by, or under the direction of, the court in which the conviction was entered that 
indicates the existence of a conviction” and other similar documents, which “shall 
constitute proof of a criminal conviction.”17  Doing so, we conclude that Marcinkowski 
was convicted of Count I.  The Information, signed by the District Attorney, combined 
with the second Criminal Court Sheet, signed by the judge, unambiguously demonstrates 
that Marcinkowski pleaded guilty to Count One in January 2006.  Thus, the BIA’s 
ultimate conclusion was sound:  The notation “CT #1” was “probative evidence” that 
Marcinkowski was sentenced on Count One, particularly considering that Count One was 
the only count that, on its own, could have resulted in the sentence that Marcinkowski 
received.18   
                                              
17 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41; see also Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 
737, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[Section 1229a(c)(3)(B)] is similar to the approach of Taylor 
and Shepard, but to the extent of any difference the statute must control.”); cf. Noriega-
Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2003) (where petitioner contested 
“whether he was convicted at all” because of a discrepancy in court documentation 
following a merger of superior and municipal courts in California, the court should 
“investigate the alleged underlying conviction as thoroughly as is necessary to ascertain 
whether the jurisdictional bar applies” (emphasis added)). 
18 A.R. 4.  Count One, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and/or 
manufacture in violation of section 780-113(a)(30), permits a maximum sentence of ten 
years’ imprisonment.  35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(f)(1.1).  Counts Two, possession in 
violation of section 780-113(a)(16), and Three, possession of paraphernalia in violation 
of section 780-113(a)(32), both permit a maximum sentence of one year’s imprisonment.  
Id. § 780-113(b), (i). 
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IV 
Because we conclude that Marcinkowski was convicted of a crime related to a 
controlled substance,19 we lack jurisdiction to hear his appeal.20  We therefore will 
dismiss his petition for review. 
                                              
19 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).   
20 Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C). 
